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I. INTRODUCTION 
The first battle in complex commercial litigation is often fought 
over removal and remand. Corporate defendants generally believe that 
federal courts are a more efficient and sympathetic venue than state 
courts, and will thus generally pursue removal whenever possible. In 
contrast, Plaintiffs generally fight to keep lawsuits in state court because 
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of their familiarity with local practice and the local judiciary.1 Although 
these beliefs were likely developed through experience and anecdotal 
evidence, studies have identified a “removal effect” that causes a 
“precipitous drop in the plaintiffs’ win rate” in cases that are removed to 
federal court.2 As if this impact on the ultimate issue of liability was not 
enough, the importance of a district court’s decision on remand is further 
emphasized by the finality of its decision, which is generally not 
reviewable on appeal.3 
Magistrate judges are increasingly being asked to resolve these 
disputes and decide remand motions. However, there is a split within the 
federal courts over whether these decisions are within the authority of 
magistrate judges to “hear and determine.” Nearly every district court 
has treated remand as nondispositive and thus within the scope of this 
authority, but all four circuit courts that have confronted the issue have 
deemed remand dispositive and thus beyond the scope of a magistrate’s 
authority. Although seemingly trivial, the difference is significant 
because district courts review magistrate judges’ findings on dispositive 
motions under a de novo standard, while nondispositive motions receive 
the less stringent review only for clear error of law.4 As a result, litigants 
in circuits where such motions are treated as dispositive are effectively 
afforded two chances to make the case for removal—once to the 
magistrate judge and again to the district court judge on de novo 
review—while those in circuits where remand motions are treated as 
nondispositive will be left with no similar recourse. Because removal is 
viewed as being largely outcome determinative, resolving this split and 
applying a uniform standard of review to these decisions is crucial. 
This article seeks to explore the split between the district courts and 
the circuit courts over whether remand is dispositive or nondispositive, 
and in the process, provide an interesting peek into the history of 
magistrate judges and the expanding role that these judges (before whom 
                                                                                                             
 1 E.g., RICHARD G. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE 235 (2d ed. 
1997) (“Commonly, the defendants will remove a case . . . for the same reasons many 
plaintiffs invoked that jurisdiction—to avoid possible bias of a local state court with its 
locally elected judge.”) 
 2 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything About The Legal System? Win Rates And Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 581, 593 (1998) (reviewing data collected from 1978-1991 and concluding that 
plaintiffs’ “overall win rate in federal cases is 57.9%, but in the subset of those cases that 
have been removed, the win rate is only 36.77%.”). 
 3 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006) (“An order remanding a case to the State court from 
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except [for civil rights 
cases].”). 
 4 Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(a) (West 2005); FED R. CIV. P. 
72(a). 
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practitioners increasingly find themselves during litigation) will play in 
the future. The first part of this article explores the history of magistrate 
judges and the expansion of their authority to resolve a wide variety of 
issues historically handled by district court judges. The second part 
explores the split between the district courts and the circuit courts. The 
third part suggests that remand motions should be within a magistrate 
judge’s authority to “hear and determine” in light of the nature of 
remand, the historical role magistrate judges have played and the steady 
attempts by both the district courts (for whose benefit the magistrate 
judges were created) and Congress (who created the position) to broaden 
the scope of magistrate judges’ authority.   
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES AND THEIR AUTHORITY 
 
Magistrate judges5 are “creatures of statute,” and their jurisdiction 
thus extends only as far as the authority granted to them by Congress.6 
Any attempt to define the limits of their jurisdiction must therefore begin 
by analyzing the language of the Federal Magistrates Act (“the Act”) and 
the intent of Congress when it created enacted the Act. “Cognizant of the 
dictates of Article III, which require that only judges with tenure and 
salary protection conduct core judicial business, Congress [] precluded 
magistrate [judges] from issuing orders that ‘determine[] with finality the 
duties of the parties.’”7 Stated differently, while Congress permitted 
magistrate judges to hear all matters unconnected to issues litigated at 
trial,8 only Article III judges are permitted to perform “inherently 
judicial” tasks.9 Consistent with these concerns, the Act permits 
magistrate judges to “hear and determine” all pretrial matters,10 except 
for eight specific dispositive matters for which they can only submit 
“proposed findings of fact and recommendations” to the district court for 
de novo review.11 Remand is not included in the list of eight dispositive 
matters that are beyond the authority of magistrate judges to “hear and 
                                                                                                             
 5 The formal title of the new judicial officers created by Congress in 1968 was 
originally United States Magistrate. It remained this way until Congress changed the 
name to United States Magistrate Judge in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. For 
the sake of consistency, “magistrate judge” is used throughout this article. 
 6 E.g., NLRB v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir.1994) (“[F]ederal 
magistrates are creatures of statute, and so is their jurisdiction. We cannot augment it; we 
cannot ask them to do something Congress has not authorized them to do.”). 
 7 Campbell v. IBM, 912 F. Supp. 116, 118 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Frazier, 
966 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 8 United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 585 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 9 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 549 (1962). 
 10 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(A) (West 2006). 
 11 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(B) (West 2006). 
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determine.” While this is an important factor in analyzing whether 
remand is beyond the scope of a magistrate judge’s authority, it is not 
dispositive. Rather, to fully understand the issue and the context in which 
it arises requires some understanding of both the evolution of the Act, 
FED. R. CIV. P. 72, which was enacted to implement certain amendments 
to the Act, and the steady expansion of the authority with which 
magistrate judges have been entrusted by Congress. 
A. THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT12 
In 1968, Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 631-639 (1968), and established the position of federal magistrate 
judge to upgrade and expand the United States Commissioner system 
that had existed in the federal courts since 1793.13 “The Act grew from 
Congress’ recognition that a multitude of new statutes and regulations 
had created an avalanche of additional work for the district courts which 
could be performed only by multiplying the number of judges or giving 
judges additional assistance.”14 The new judicial position was thus 
created to act as an adjunct to district court judges and help alleviate the 
burden imposed on them by ever expanding caseloads in the federal 
courts. 
In the years since the Act was first passed into law, Congress has 
generally afforded district courts leeway to experiment with different 
uses for magistrate judges and has periodically amended the Act to 
codify the techniques developed by enterprising courts.15 It is in this 
spirit that district courts have increasingly permitted magistrate judges to 
adjudicate a growing number of substantive, pretrial matters, including 
removal and remand. 
                                                                                                             
 12 This section is not intended to be an exhaustive history of the Federal Magistrates 
Act, but is instead focused on the development of the Act as it relates to the expanding 
authority of magistrate judges, and specifically, the authority of magistrate judges to hear 
and determine remand motions. For a more detailed explanation of the changing role of 
magistrate judges over the years, see, e.g.: Philip M. Pro, Measured Progress: The 
Evolution And Administration Of The Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1503 (1995); A Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 
247 (June 1993) (prepared by the Magistrate Judges Division of the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts; Christopher Smith, From U.S. Magistrates to U.S. 
Magistrate Judges, 75 Judicature 210, 211 (1992); Note, Article III Constraints And The 
Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 
1023 (1979). 
 13 E.g., United States v. Maresca, 266 F. 713, 719–20 (S.D.N.Y 1920). 
 14 Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 267 (1976). 
 15 Note, supra note 12, at 1028 (“[M]uch of the post-1968 legislation has either 
systematized magistrate reference techniques pioneered by innovative district courts or 
removed case-law and legislative obstacles to their further development.”). 
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The United States Commissioner System that Congress sought to 
replace in 1968 traced its origins to the early days of the United States. 
While the title of “Commissioner” was only created in 1896, Congress 
had, as early as 1793, authorized the federal circuit courts to appoint 
“discreet persons learned in the law” to take bail and perform certain 
other ministerial functions.16 From this “seed,” the position and authority 
of the Commissioners grew steadily through the 1800s and early 1900s.17 
Nonetheless, however useful these Commissioners may have been to the 
district courts, their shortcomings became obvious as the judiciary 
matured and the caseload of the federal courts expanded. Commissioners 
received no formal training from the federal judiciary and had no official 
staff, clerks, or offices.18 They were paid under an “anachronistic fee 
system” that was based on the “nature and number” of matters they 
handled.19 They were not prohibited from having a “direct” and 
“substantial” pecuniary interest in the matters they were adjudicating.20 
Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, there was no requirement that 
Commissioners be lawyers or even trained in the law, even though they 
were often “called upon to apply some of the most sophisticated rules of 
constitutional law—rules that the best attorneys and judges are hard 
pressed to apply correctly.”21 
By 1965, these shortcomings became too obvious to ignore and 
Congress began holding hearings to examine the roles Commissioners 
played and to attempt to improve the system. From these hearings, two 
conflicting proposals emerged. The first would have effectively 
eliminated the office and required district court judges to assume the 
responsibilities previously undertaken by the Commissioners.22 The 
second, which was “overwhelmingly favored” by Congress,23 was to 
reform the system rather than abandon it altogether: 
                                                                                                             
 16 Maresca, 266 F. at 719–20.  
 17 Id. at 720. 
 18 H.R. REP. NO. 90–1629 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252, 4256 
(noting that “[a]ll but a handful of Commissioners—those with full time appointments, 
who are prohibited from practicing law—must meet the expenses of their office from 
their own resources” and identifying the “lack of any effective administrative apparatus 
within the judiciary” to assist or train Commissioners). 
 19 Id. In addition to being complicated, the fee system was capped at $10,500 per 
year, thus making it difficult to “attract the best men for the job” because the “busiest 
Commissioners [were] grossly underpaid.” 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id.  
 22 Id. at 4257; see also Hon Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, 
Congress, and the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part Two: The Third Branch 
Reacts” 81 AM. BANKR. L.J.. 165, 168 (2007). 
 23 Mund, supra note 22, at 168. 
308 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:303 
Although the present U.S. Commissioner system is in 
many ways defective it is neither practical nor 
desirable simply to abolish the Commissioner system 
and transfer the functions now performed by that 
office to the U.S. district court judges, who are 
already overburdened by their present duties . . . .24 
Accordingly, Congress sought to create an “upgraded system of 
judicial officers” and increase the “scope of the responsibilities that can 
be discharged by that office,” with the ultimate goal being to increase the 
“overall efficiency of the federal judiciary.”25 
The 1968 Act was thus an attempt by Congress to “update and 
make more effective a system that [was not] altered basically for over a 
century, and to cull from the ever-growing workload of the U.S. district 
courts matters that are more desirably performed by a lower tier of 
judicial officers.”26 The Act rectified the shortcomings in the 
Commissioner system by giving magistrate judges a fixed term of office, 
eliminating the outdated and conflict-ridden fee system, and requiring 
that all magistrate judges be licensed attorneys.27 Congress also codified 
the authority of magistrate judges to exercise all powers formerly 
exercised by the Commissioners, and empowered them to try a wide 
variety of additional matters with the consent of the parties.28 
Congress also authorized magistrate judges to perform “additional 
duties” assigned by the district courts provided these duties were “not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”29 
Congress intended to leave open ended the “additional duties” with 
which these new judicial officers could be tasked. The reason for this 
was twofold. First, Congress was apprehensive about the magistrate 
judges system, with many members questioning the wisdom and 
constitutionality of the new position it had created, particularly to the 
extent that it might allow district judges to improperly delegate to 
magistrate judges duties reserved to Article III judges.30 Second, and 
more relevant for our purposes, Congress intended that the district court 
judges would experiment with the assignment of “additional duties” to 
magistrate judges to suit the needs of the district courts.31 As discussed 
below, these concerns resurface in the debate over whether magistrate 
                                                                                                             
 24 H.R. REP. NO. 90-1629 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252, 4257. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 4255. 
 27 Id. 
     28  Id. at 4253–54. 
     29  H.R. REP. NO. 90-1629 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252, 4269 
     30 Id. at 4269. 
     31 Id. at 4253–62. 
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judges can “hear and determine” remand motions, with those opposed to 
the practice citing Article III concerns, and those in favor arguing that 
district judges should be permitted to experiment by allowing magistrate 
judges to issue remand orders. 
As originally drafted, the Act included three examples of such 
“additional duties” that could be handled by magistrate judges—to serve 
as special masters in civil lawsuits, to assist with pretrial discovery 
matters, and to conduct preliminary review of applications for post-trial 
relief—but made clear that this list was not exhaustive. Nonetheless, this 
intention was misapprehended by the Supreme Court in the first case in 
which it had occasion to review the Act. In Wingo v. Wedding, the Court 
ruled that magistrate judges could not preside over habeas corpus 
proceedings because nothing in the text or legislative history of the Act 
indicated that Congress intended to change the requirement that Article 
III judges preside over such proceedings, nor did the Act specifically 
prescribe such a practice.32 In dissent, Justice Burger (joined by Justice 
White) criticized the majority for having ignored the stated purpose of 
Congress when it enacted the Act—to permit district judges to utilize 
magistrate judges to relieve the burden on the district courts.33 Justice 
Burger closed his dissenting opinion by indicating that the Court had 
“construed [the Act] contrary to clear legislative intent” and suggested 
that it was now “for the Congress to act to restate its intentions if its 
declared objectives are to be carried out in the discretion of a judge of the 
district court.”34 
Congress took Justice Burger’s advice and, in 1976, amended the 
Act to “clarify and further define the additional duties which may be 
assigned to a United States Magistrate [Judge].”35 Among other things, 
the magistrate judges’ duties were expanded to include the ability to 
“hear and determine any pretrial matter” subject only to review and 
reconsideration by a district court if a magistrate judge’s ruling was 
“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”36 However, Congress excluded 
eight specific motions from this expanded authority, including motions: 
                                                                                                             
     32 Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 468, 470 (1974), superseded by statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 636(b), as recognized in Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989).  The 
Court did not reach the issue of whether permitting magistrate judges to preside over 
habeas corpus proceedings would be “consistent” with the Constitution. As is its practice, 
the Court read the language of the statute narrowly so as to avoid reaching the 
constitutional issue. Id. at 467 n. 4. 
 33 Id. at 475–76. 
 34 Id. at 487. 
 35 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1609 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 6162; see also 
Gomez, 490 U.S. at 867. 
     36   28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
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(1) for injunctive relief; (2) for judgment on the pleadings; (3) for 
summary judgment; (4) to dismiss or quash an indictment or information 
made by the defendant; (5) to suppress evidence in a criminal case; (6) to 
dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action; (7) to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (8) to 
involuntarily dismiss an action.37 For these matters, magistrate judges 
were permitted to conduct evidentiary hearings and recommend 
dispositions, but the district court was required to “make a de novo 
determination”38 of any portion of the recommendation objected to by 
one of the parties. 
Congress was compelled to amend the Act in response to Wingo 
and another Supreme Court decision, Mathews v. Weber,39 which 
interpreted the Act narrowly as permitting district judges to assign to 
magistrate judges only those duties specifically set forth in the Act. 
Congress rejected this interpretation as being inconsistent with one of the 
foundational purposes of the Act, which was to allow district judges the 
flexibility to utilize magistrate judges in whatever manner best allowed 
the district judges to devote more time to the “actual trial of cases” and 
the writing of opinions:40 
Under this subsection, the district courts would 
remain free to experiment in the assignment of other 
duties to magistrates which may not necessarily be 
included in the broad category of “pretrial matters.” 
. . .  
If district judges are willing to experiment with the 
assignment to magistrates of other functions in the aid 
of the business of the courts, there will be increased 
time available to judges for the careful and unhurried 
performance of their vital and traditional adjudicatory 
duties.41 
While this freedom was ultimately constrained by the requirement that 
any duties assigned to a magistrate judge not be “inconsistent with the 
Constitution or the laws of the United States,”42 Congress made clear 
                                                                                                             
 37 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 
 38 The term de novo signifies that the magistrate judge’s findings are not protected by 
the clearly erroneous doctrine, but does not necessarily require the district court judge to 
conduct a second evidentiary hearing. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). 
 39 Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). 
 40 Id. at 272 n.7 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-1065, at 3 (1972)); see also McCarthy v. 
Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 142 (1981). 
 41 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1609 at 12. 
 42 Id. 
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with its 1976 amendments to the Act that it did not intend to dictate to 
district court judges the best uses of magistrate judges within these broad 
constraints. 
Congress again amended the Act in 1979. By this time, 
Congressional doubts about the utility and ability of magistrate judges 
had subsided and Congress recognized that the magistrate system 
“[played] an integral and important role in the Federal judicial system.”43 
Accordingly, “Congress enlarged the magistrate’s jurisdiction over civil 
and criminal trials, codifying some of the experiments conducted under 
the Act’s additional duties clause.”44 Among other things, the 1979 
amendments permitted a magistrate judge, with the consent of the 
parties, to conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or non-jury civil 
matter and order the entry of judgment in the case and required the 
district judge to notify the parties of this opportunity.45 Thus, with the 
1976 and 1979 amendments, Congress enlarged the jurisdiction and 
expanded the authority of magistrate judges to conform to the prevailing 
practices in the various district courts. 
Finally, in 1990 Congress amended the Act to formally change the 
title of the magistrates’ position from United States Magistrate to United 
States Magistrate Judge.46 The change was enacted to correct the many 
“practical problems” created because “lawyers did not accord the 
subordinate judicial officers with appropriate deference and respect.”47 
Congress felt the name change was needed to “help educate attorneys 
and litigants about the magistrate judges’ status as authoritative judicial 
officers within the federal courts.”48 Though largely symbolic, this name 
change marks the end of a process that saw the position of magistrate 
judge rise from one that Congress viewed with caution and guarded 
optimism to full-fledged “judicial officers.” 
 
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 
FED R. CIV. P. 72 was enacted in 1983 to implement the 1976 
amendments to the Act.49 Prior to the enactment of Rule 72, there had 
been no uniform, federal rules governing either the procedures district 
courts were to follow when referring matters to magistrate judges or the 
                                                                                                             
 43 H.R, REP. NO. 96-287 at 5 (1979). 
 44 Id. 
 45 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(1). 
 46 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). 
 47 Smith, supra note 12. 
 48 Id. at 212. 
 49 FED R. CIV. P. 72 advisory committee’s note. 
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procedures magistrate judges were to follow in carrying out their 
duties.50 Congress essentially left it to the individual district courts to 
develop local rules on these issues, but this approach ultimately proved 
unworkable because local rules, when enacted at all, were often 
inaccessible and inconsistent across jurisdictions.51 Accordingly 
Congress enacted FED. R. CIV. P. 72 to resolve these discrepancies, 
establish uniform standards, and provide guidance to district courts and 
magistrate judges alike.52 
Rule 72(a) governs “nondispositive matters,” and provides that 
magistrate judges may “hear and determine” any such matters and “enter 
into the record a written order setting forth the disposition of the matter.” 
Rule 72(b) governs “dispositive motions,” and provides that magistrate 
judges may only conduct evidentiary hearings into such matters and 
“enter into the record a recommendation for disposition of the matter.”53 
Under either subsection, the parties have 10 days to “serve and file” 
objections to the magistrate judge’s decision with the district court, and 
the district court maintains the ultimate authority to “modify or set aside 
any portions of the magistrate judge’s” that it finds objectionable.54 
However, consistent with the terms of the Act, Rule 72 mandates that a 
magistrate judge’s order issued on a nondispositive matter is reviewed by 
the district court under the highly-deferential “clearly erroneous or 
contrary to law” standard,55 while the “report and recommendation” from 
the magistrate judge on a dispositive matter is reviewed de novo by the 
district court.56 
While Rule 72 divides pretrial motions into “dispositive” and 
“nondispositive” matters, neither these terms nor the distinction they 
create appears in the Act. Instead, the Act permits magistrate judges to 
“hear and determine any pretrial matter” with the exception of the eight 
motions identified in subsection 636(b)(1)(B). This apparent 
inconsistency has caused some confusion among courts and 
commentators over how certain motions should be classified for 
                                                                                                             
 50 See 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L MARCUS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3067 (2d ed. 1997); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 
636(b)(4) (“Each district court shall establish rules pursuant to which the magistrate 
judges shall discharge their duties.”). 
 51 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 50; § 636(b)(4). 
 52 In addition to Rule 72, Congress also enacted Rules 73–76 to establish the 
procedures to be followed by district courts and magistrate judges when matters are 
referred to the magistrate judges for trial on consent of the parties.  See FED R. CIV. P. 
73-76. 
     53   FED R. CIV. P. 72. 
 54 Id. 
 55 FED R. CIV. P. 72(a). 
 56 FED R. CIV. P. 72(b). 
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purposes of determining the appropriate level of review by the district 
court. Under one view, the terms “dispositive” and “nondispositive” are 
interpreted as being “synonymous with the statute’s language” and thus 
the “dispositive” motions for which de novo review is required are only 
those eight specific motions listed in subsection 636(b)(1)(B).57 Under 
the competing view, “dispositive” motions are not limited to these eight 
motions, but include “at the very least, the eight motions listed in the 
statute” along with any other motions that are “dispositive of a claim or 
defense of a party.”58 As discussed below, this dispute—which is 
essentially over whether the list of eight motions in section 636(b)(1)(B) 
is exhaustive or illustrative—animates the split between the district 
courts and the circuit courts over whether magistrate judges can “hear 
and determine” remand motions. 
III. THE SPLIT 
Unlike a traditional “split” in the federal courts, where different 
circuits disagree over an issue, all the circuit courts that have confronted 
the issue discussed in this article have concluded that remand is a matter 
that is beyond the authority of a magistrate judge to “hear and 
determine.” However, district courts have consistently rejected this 
approach, and have continued to permit magistrate judges to “hear and 
determine” remand motions subject only to review for clear error of law, 
even after the contrary trend in the circuit courts became clear.59 Thus, 
though unorthodox, the “split” discussed below is no less important, 
                                                                                                             
 57 E.g., Meier v. Premier Wine & Spirits, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 239, 242–43 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Rule 72’s references to ‘dispositive’ and ‘nondispositive’ orders is 
intended to be synonymous with the statute’s language.”); Adkins v. Mid-American 
Growers, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 171, 175 n.3, 176 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“‘Dispositive’ is merely a 
term used to describe the motions listed in subsection 636(b)(1)(A) . . . . The terms 
‘dispositive’ and ‘nondispositive’ in Rule 72 do not create categories separate from the 
statute which Rule 72 implements.”). 
 58 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 50, at 332–38. In support of this conclusion, Wright 
and Miller note that proponents of the 1976 revisions to the Federal Magistrates Act 
divided pretrial activities into dispositive and nondispositive matters when debating the 
revisions. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94–1609 (1976) (“The bill provides for different 
procedures depending upon whether the proceeding involves a matter preliminary to trial 
or a motion which is dispositive of the action.”). These characterizations—which are 
inherently assumed to be broader than what was ultimately included in the Act—were 
purportedly motivated by Congress’s concerns that non-Article III judges might 
“ultimately determine” matters dispositive of a case. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 50, at 
334. Wright and Miller further support their position by noting that various courts that 
applied the Act prior to the enactment of Rule 72 generally did not limit the matters for 
which de novo review was applied to only those eight motions identified in the Act. Id. at 
334–36. 
     59   Obviously this has not been the case in district courts within the Second, Third, 
Sixth or Tenth Circuits, where the circuit courts have spoken on the issue.   
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particularly to the extent that it reveals the different ways the federal trial 
courts and federal appeals courts view the role of magistrate judges and 
the overall management of the ever-growing case loads of the district 
courts. 
Nearly every district court that has confronted the issue has 
concluded that remand motions are nondispositive and can be determined 
by magistrate judges subject only to review by the district court for clear 
error of law.60 Most of these courts arrived at this conclusion through a 
strict reading of both the Act and Rule 72 that focuses on: (1) remand not 
being included in the list of matters identified in the Section 636 
(b)(1)(B) as being beyond the authority of magistrate judges to “hear and 
determine” with limited review from the district court; and (2) remand 
not being dispositive for purposes of Rule 72 because it is not the 
functional equivalent of any of the dispositive motions contained in 
section 636(b)(1)(A). 
For certain district courts, resolving the issue of whether remand 
orders should be subject to “clearly erroneous” or de novo review is a 
simple matter of reading the Act. For these courts, the list of eight 
motions included in section 636(b)(1)(A) is exhaustive.61 Because 
remand is not included on the list, it does not require such demanding 
scrutiny and can instead be reviewed only for clear error of law. As one 
district court in the Southern District of Texas noted: 
                                                                                                             
 60 E.g., Franklin v. Homewood, No. 07-TMP-006-S, 2007 WL 1804411, at * 2–4 
(N.D. Ala. June 21, 2007); Wachovia Bank, N.A., v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 
397 F. Supp. 698, 700–02 (W.D.N.C. 2005); Johnson v. Wyeth, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 
1273–75 (N.D. Ala. 2004); Vogel v. U.S. Office Prods. Co., 56 F. Supp. 2d 859, 861–63 
(W.D. Mich. 1999), rev’d 258 F.3d 509, 514–17 (6th Cir. 2001); Campbell v. IBM, 912 
F. Supp. 116, 118–19 (D.N.J. 1996); Young v. James, 168 F.R.D. 24, 26–27 (E.D. Va. 
1996); Delta Dental of R.I. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., 942 F. Supp. 740, 743–
46 (D.R.I. 1996); DeCastro v. AWACS, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 692, 694–96 (D.N.J. 1996); 
Vaquillas Ranch Co. v. Texaco Exploration, 844 F. Supp. 1156, 1160–63 (S.D. Tex. 
1994); Banbury v. Omnitrition Intern., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 276, 279 (D. Minn. 1993); City 
of Jackson v. Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 122, 123–24 (S.D. Miss. 
1993); White v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 153 F.R.D. 639, 642–43 (D. Neb. 1993); 
Holt v. Tonawanda Coke Corp., 802 F. Supp. 866, 868 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Doe v. 
American Red Cross, 763 F. Supp. 1084, 1085 (D. Or. 1991); McDonough v. Blue Cross 
of Northeastern Pa., 131 F.R.D. 467, 472 (W.D. Pa. 1990); Acme Electric Corp. v. Sigma 
Instruments, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 26, 28 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); North Jersey Savings & Loan 
Association v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, 125 F.R.D. 96, 98–99 (D.N.J. 
1988); Hitachi Cable Am., Inc. v. Wines, No. 85-4265, 1986 WL 2135, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 
14, 1986); Jacobsen v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 594 F. Supp. 
583, 586 (D. Maine 1984); see also Searcy v. Knostman, 155 B.R. 699, 702 (Bankr. S.D. 
Miss. 1993); but see Giangola v. Walt Disney, 753 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1990); Long v. 
Lockheed Missles & Space Co., 783 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.S.C. 1992). 
 61 See e.g., Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1273; Vaquillas Ranch, 844 F. Supp. at 1162; 
Adkins, 143 F.R.D. at 175 n.3, 176; North Jersey Savings & Loan, 125 F.R.D. at 98; 
Jacobsen, 594 F. Supp. at 586. 
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This Court finds persuasive the reasoning and analysis 
of those authorities holding that the term “dispositive” 
refers to the list of motions that a magistrate judge 
may not determine found in §636(b)(1)(A). . . . 
Building on that foundation, this Court also believes 
that the listing found in §636(b)(1)(A) is exhaustive 
and reflects Congress’ intent that only those motions 
that are listed be construed as dispositive and thus 
outside the power of a magistrate judge to 
determine.62 
For these courts, a strict reading of the Act is required in order to 
conform to Congress’s intent: “Congress had the opportunity to include 
in that list any motion which it considered to be dispositive, and it did 
not include motions to remand.”63 Moreover, according to courts that 
take this narrow view of the Act, this interpretation reinforces the 
original purposes behind the Act and the steady expansion of magistrate 
judges’ authority, which was to “relieve the district courts of certain 
subordinate duties that often distract the courts from more important 
matters.”64 
Other district courts view the fact that remand is not one of the 
matters specifically mentioned in Section 636(b)(1)(A) as relevant to the 
analysis but not by itself determinative of the issue.65 These courts focus 
more on the nature of remand and whether it is the functional equivalent 
of the motions included in Section 636(b)(1)(A) and should thus be 
considered “dispositive” under Rule 72 and subject to a higher level of 
review by district courts. While this approach is the same one followed 
in the Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth circuit decisions discussed below, 
                                                                                                             
 62 Vaquillas Ranch, 844 F. Supp. at 1162; see also Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 
(“If Congress had wanted to place remand of removed cases beyond the ‘hear and 
determine’ authority of magistrate judges, it could should and would have listed is as one 
of the matters expressly excluded from that authority.”); North Jersey Savings & Loan, 
125 F.R.D. at 98 (“A motion to remand for improper removal is not listed [in Section 
636(b)(1)(A)], and is therefore subject to ‘final’ determination by a magistrate.”); 
Jacobsen, 594 F. Supp. at 586 (holding that remand was not one of the eight “excepted 
actions” identified in Section 636 (b)(1)(A) and thus the appropriate standard of review to 
be applied to such motions was “clearly erroneous or contrary to law”); cf Adkins, 143 
F.R.D. at 176 (Rule 11 sanctions motion) (“‘Dispositive’ is merely a term used to 
describe the motions listed in subsection 636(b)(1)(A) . . . . The terms ‘dispositive’ and 
‘nondispositive’ in Rule 72 do not create categories separate from the statute which Rule 
72 implements.”). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991)). 
 65 Campbell, 912 F. Supp. at 119 (“That remand is not specifically mentioned in § 
636(b)(1)(A) is relevant (although not critical) to the Court’s analysis.”). 
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the result arrived at by the district courts is the opposite of the one 
arrived at by the circuit courts. 
The district courts that have adopted this approach have almost 
universally determined that remand is not like the motions identified in 
section 636(b)(1)(A), and should not be considered dispositive, because 
remand does not resolve any claims, defenses, or substantive rights, but 
instead merely transfers a lawsuit to a different forum.66 Unlike many of 
the motions identified in section 636(b)(1)(A)—e.g., motions for 
judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim, or to involuntarily dismiss an action—remand “decides 
only the question of whether there is a proper basis for federal 
jurisdiction to support removal.”67 As a district court in the District of 
Nebraska noted: 
                                                                                                             
 66  See, e.g., Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411 at * 3 (“Granting or denying a motion for 
remand does not bring about a final determination of a case: the case will simply be 
remanded for determination by a state court or remain in federal court. Therefore, ruling 
on a motion to remand is not a dispositive determination.”); Vogel, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 863 
(“[A] motion for remand does not address the substance of a party’s claims or 
defenses . . . . While . . . remand forecloses the maintenance of the action in a federal 
forum, this Court does not believe that use of a particular forum should be identified as a 
claim or defense of either party.”); Delta Dental, 942 F. Supp. at 746 (holding that 
motions to proceed in forma pauperis and to strike pleadings have a “sense of finality” 
that remand motions lack because remand still allows the parties to “assert all claims and 
defenses” in state court); Campbell, 912 F. Supp. at 119 (holding that remand motions are 
nondispositive, in part because, they “merely transfer the action to a different forum 
rather than finally resolving the substantive rights and obligations of the parties”); City of 
Jackson, 147 F.R.D. at 124 (“The motion to remand does not reach the merits of the 
underlying dispute but instead decides only the questions of whether removal to the 
federal court was proper. The parties remain free to litigate the merits of the case 
following the disposition of the motion, whether in state or federal court.”); Holt, 802 F. 
Supp. at 868 (“A motion to remand is not dispositive since a decision on the motion 
decides only the question of whether there is a proper basis for federal jurisdiction to 
support removal, and neither reaches nor determines the merits of a plaintiff’s 
claim . . . .”); McDonough, 131 F.R.D. at 472 (“Remand merely determines that the 
litigation shall take place in state court rather than federal court; thus we are authorized to 
enter final order remanding the matter to state court.”); cf Robinson v. Eng, 148 F.R.D. 
635, 640 (D. Neb. 1993) (motion for Rule 11 sanction) (“Congress clearly has not chosen 
to categorize as ‘dispositive’ any ruling that resolves an issue. Rather, it is only those 
rulings which finally resolve a party’s ‘claim or defense’ which are considered 
‘dispositive’ within the meaning of § 636(b) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72.”); but see Haag v. 
Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1136 (D. Minn. 2002); 
Giangola, 753 F. Supp. at 152 (holding that “a remand order is the equivalent of a 
dismissal” and that “no issue is so accurately described as dispositive as a determination 
which will destroy or uphold the Court’s jurisdiction); Long v. Lockheed Missiles and 
Space Company, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.S.C. 1992) (“The analysis of the court in 
Giangola is the preferred approach to this case because it combines both the statutory 
language with the practical effects of a dismissal from federal court.”).     
 67 Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411 at * 3. 
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[A]n order of remand to a state court is not an order 
similar to those adjudicative functions [reserved for 
Article III judges], for two reasons: first, a remand 
order does not terminate the litigation; and, second, it 
does not dispose of the pending claim. The claim at 
issue in this case . . . will continue to be litigated in 
the state courts; the order of remand will not alter the 
parties’ opportunity to advocate their positions or to 
be ably heard in a court of law. Nor should remanding 
the case change in any way the outcome of that claim 
on the merits.68 
Tellingly, district courts outside of the Second, Third, Sixth, and 
Tenth Circuits have continued to adopt this interpretation of Rule 72 
even in the face of the unanimous rejection of the approach by the these 
circuit courts.69 For these district courts, a motion, such as one to remand 
                                                                                                             
 68 White, 153 F.R.D. at 643. 
 69 As a district court in the Western District of New York recently noted, prior to the 
Second Circuit taking up the issue: 
I respectfully disagree with [the analysis employed by the 
Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits] for two reasons. . . . First . . . 
[t]he [Federal Magistrates Act’s] plain language [] permits a 
magistrate to hear and determine a pretrial motion for remand 
under § 1447 . . . . Second, even assuming that a magistrate 
lacks authority to issue a ‘dispositive’ order not listed in 
§636(b)(1)(A), a remand order, unlike an order of dismissal, is 
not dispositive. A dismissal ends a lawsuit. The disappointed 
litigant may succeed in resuscitating his claim in another 
forum, but only by commencing a new lawsuit, because the 
dismissal order was dispositive of the original action. An order 
of remand is not the functional equivalent. It neither disposes 
of the merits of a party’s claim nor terminates the party’s 
ability to seek such a disposition; most importantly, it in no 
way ends the litigation, not even conditionally. To the contrary, 
a remand order guarantees that a pending lawsuit will continue, 
albeit in a different forum. Indeed, a remand to state court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447 of an action previously removed to 
federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is in an important sense 
precisely the opposite of an order of dismissal: whereas the 
latter ends the parties’ lawsuit altogether, the former restores it 
to its original status as an active case in a state court. 
Meier, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 243. Although somewhat less direct, other district courts have 
also rejected the circuit courts’ approach to the issue: 
Dispositive means “bringing about a final determination.” 
[citing Black’s Law Dictionary]. Therefore the plain language 
of Rule 72 is concerned only with whether a matter brings 
about a final determination of a party’s claims or defenses; and 
if a matter does not “‘resolve the substantive claims for relief 
alleged in the pleadings,’ it is a nondispositive order.”  A 
motion to remand, like a motion related to venue, is concerned 
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a lawsuit to state court, which does not bring about a final determination 
of any claims or issues, cannot be dispositive for purposes of Rule 72. 
As noted above, while nearly every district court faced with the 
issue has determined that remand motions are nondispositive and can be 
heard and determined by magistrate judges, all four of the circuit courts 
that have considered the issue have come to the opposite conclusion, 
holding that remand motions are dispositive and magistrate judges can 
only provide a “report and recommendation” to the district court judge.70 
In the first of these decisions, In re U.S. Healthcare,71 the Third Circuit 
set forth the reasoning that would later be followed by the Second, Sixth, 
and Tenth Circuits, but rejected by the majority of district courts, 
including some within the purview of these circuit courts. The Third 
Circuit began by describing the “sharp distinction” in magistrate judges’ 
authority in connection with dispositive and nondispositive motions.72 
Moreover, the court acknowledged that Congress did not include remand 
motions on the list of dispositive motions that could not be adjudicated 
by magistrate judges and thus, by its terms, the Federal Magistrates Act 
did not preclude a magistrate judge from determining a remand motion.73 
Nonetheless, the court concluded, in language that would be echoed by 
its sister courts in later opinions, that the list of eight specific motions set 
forth in Section 636(b)(1)(B) was not exhaustive and that a remand 
motion was the “functional equivalent” of the motions included on this 
list because it “conclusively terminates the matter in the federal court 
against the will of the party who removed the case.”74 In support of its 
opinion, the court analogized to a situation where a plaintiff files parallel 
state and federal court lawsuits: 
We do not think that anyone would argue seriously 
that a magistrate judge, without consent of the parties, 
could hear and determine a motion to dismiss the 
federal action predicated on an absence of subject 
                                                                                                             
only with which court will hear the claims and defenses not 
with resolving the merits of those claims and defenses. 
Therefore, as a remand order does not resolve or dispose of the 
case, “the judge need only determine if the magistrate’s order 
is ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’” 
Wachovia Bank, 397 F. Supp. at 701–02. 
 70 See Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 527 F.3d 259, 264–66 (2d Cir. 2008); Vogel v. 
U.S. Office Prods. Co., 258 F.3d 509, 514–17 (6th Cir. 2001); First Union Mortg. Corp. 
v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 994–97 (10th Cir. 2000); In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 
145–46 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 71 In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 147. 
 72 Id. at 145. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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matter jurisdiction, on the theory that the motion is 
nondispositive because a parallel action is pending in 
the state court. Yet in a practical sense an order of 
remand predicated on a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is no less dispositive than an order of 
dismissal in the circumstances we describe as both 
orders have the exact same effect by permitting the 
case to proceed in the state rather than the federal 
court.75 
Ultimately, the court concluded that “Congress never intended to vest the 
power in a non-Article III judge to determine the fundamental question 
of whether a case could proceed in a federal court.”76 
 While the issue before the Third Circuit was one of first 
impression for the federal circuit courts at the time, the court 
acknowledged that the District Court for the District of New Jersey had 
reached the issue and had concluded that remand motions were 
nondispositive.77 The court rejected the district court’s reasoning, despite 
observing that the court had “surveyed district court cases and concluded 
that ‘the vast majority of the district courts within [the District of New 
Jersey] and elsewhere that have confronted this issue have held that a 
motion to remand is ‘nondispositive,’ and therefore, can be determined 
by a magistrate judge by final order.”78 Based on its survey of the 
available case law, the district court concluded that remand motions were 
nondispositive because: (1) they were not included on the list of 
dispositive motions specifically carved out of the magistrate judges 
authority in the Act; and (2) remand did not “dispose of a claim or 
defense,” but merely “transfers a case” from federal court to state court.79 
The Third Circuit summarily rejected these conclusions, holding instead 
that remand orders are dispositive of “all claims and defenses” because 
they “banish the entire case from the federal court” and again compared 
the decision to remand a case with one to dismiss a federal action for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction where a parallel proceeding was 
pending in state court.80 
The Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits largely tracked the Third 
Circuit’s reasoning in deciding that remand motions are dispositive for 
                                                                                                             
 75 In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 145–46. 
 76 Id. at 146. 
 77 Id. (citing DeCastro v. AWACS, 940 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D.N.J. 1996). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 In re U.S.Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 146. 
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purposes of a magistrate judge’s authority.81 All three courts concluded 
that: (1) the list of eight dispositive motions included in the Act is 
illustrative, not exhaustive;82 (2) the term “dispositive” in Rule 72 is not 
limited to claims and defenses;83 and (3) a remand order is the 
“functional equivalent” of an involuntary dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because it “banishes” the lawsuit from federal court, 
and thus cannot be resolved by a magistrate judge.84 
As noted above, despite the unanimity among the circuit courts on 
whether remand is dispositive, district courts that have confronted the 
issue in the wake of In re U.S. Healthcare, Vogel, First Union, and 
Beemiller have rejected their rationale and continued to deem such 
motions nondispositive and thus within a magistrate judge’s authority to 
“hear and determine” subject only to review for clear error of law.85 Each 
of these courts acknowledged the “split” in the federal courts but 
ultimately adopted the approach taken by the district courts: 
This court finds the reasoning of [courts in our own 
district], as well as the reasoning of other district 
courts, more persuasive that that of the Third, Sixth, 
and Tenth Circuits and determines that a motion to 
remand is a nondispositive issue and within the 
authority of a magistrate judge.86 
                                                                                                             
 81 See Williams, 527 F.3d at 264–66; Vogel, 258 F.3d at 514–17; First Union, 229 
F.3d at 994–96. 
 82 See Williams, 527 F.3d at 265; Vogel, 258 F.3d at 514–15; First Union, 229 F.3d at 
996. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Williams, 527 F.3d at 266 (“Because a § 1447(c) remand order ‘determines the 
fundamental question of whether a case could proceed in a federal court, it is 
indistinguishable from a motion to dismiss the action from federal court based a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction for the purpose of [the Federal Magistrates Act]’”) (internal 
citation omitted); see also Vogel, 258 F.3d at 517 (“[W]e apply a functional equivalency 
test to see if a particular motion has the same practical effect as a recognized dispositive 
motion. Applying that test, and adopting the analysis of the Third and Tenth Circuits, we 
too find that a remand order is the functional equivalent of an order to dismiss.”); First 
Union, 229 F.3d at 996 (“A remand order is a final decision in the sense that it is 
‘dispositive of all the claims in the case as it banishes the entire case from the federal 
court” . . . It is thus very similar in effect to an involuntary dismissal . . . for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.”). As noted in supra, note 40 a small minority of district 
courts have followed this same rationale. 
 85 E.g., Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411 at ** 2–3; Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 700–
03; Meier, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 241–44; Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1273–75. 
 86 See Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411 at * 2; see also Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 
701, 702 (noting that there is “trouble at each step of [the] process” employed by the 
circuit courts, “finding Vogel and First Union unpersuasive,” before holding that a 
“magistrate judge may hear and determine a motion to remand, subject only to ‘clearly 
erroneous or clear error of law’ review by a district court”); Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 
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This explicit rejection of countervailing circuit court authority, 
albeit non-binding authority, is telling. What it reveals is an apparent 
desire on the part of district courts to permit magistrate judges to “hear 
and determine” remand motions. As discussed below, this is ultimately 
the better reasoned approach because it adheres more closely to both the 
letter and the spirit of the Federal Magistrates Act, which was created, at 
least in part, to permit the district courts to experiment with the 
responsibilities delegated to magistrate judges in order to effectively 
manage their ever-increasing caseload and “increase the overall 
efficiency of the federal judiciary.”87 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Plain Language Of The Federal Magistrates Act Permits 
Magistrate Judges To “Hear And Determine” Remand Motions 
 
“The starting point for the interpretation of a statute is always its 
language.”88 This “preeminent canon of statutory interpretation” requires 
that we “presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says.”89 As a result, any inquiry into the 
meaning of a statute “begins with the statutory text, and ends there as 
well if the text is unambiguous.”90 In this case, the legislative will 
regarding the scope of a magistrate judge’s mandate was expressed in 
unambiguous terms in Congress’s vesting in magistrate judges the 
authority to “hear and determine any pretrial matter” except for a list of 
eight specific motions.91 Remand is not included in this list. As a result, 
the clear language of the Act supports the conclusion that magistrate 
judges should be permitted to “hear and determine” remand motions. 
Congress was unequivocal in the language it chose to use when 
revising the Act to broaden the scope of magistrate judges’ authority 
except in connection with certain specific motions. As one district court 
noted: “Congress would be hard-pressed to use language more clearly 
indicating its intent to create an exhaustive list that “any . . . except.”92 
Had Congress intended to exclude remand from the scope of a magistrate 
                                                                                                             
1273 (“This court finds the reasoning of the above-cited district courts more persuasive 
that the reasoning of the above-captioned courts of appeal.”). 
 87 Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 702. 
 88 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989). 
 89 BedRoc, Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (citing Connecticut 
Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–254(1992)). 
 90 Id. 
 91 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 92 Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. 2d 698 (emphasis omitted). 
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judges’ authority, it “could, should, and would” have done so.93 
“Because Congress explicitly set out matters that are not within the 
authority of a magistrate judge and because remand is not among them, a 
decision regarding remand is a valid authority of a magistrate judge.”94 
If there was any doubt about whether Congress intended the list of 
motions included in Section 636(b)(1)(A) to be exhaustive or illustrative, 
it is resolved by the legislative history surrounding the 1976 
Amendments to the Act. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports 
that accompanied those Amendments included language evidencing 
Congress’s clear intent that only certain, specific motions would be 
placed beyond the authority of magistrate judges.95 For instance, the 
House Committee Report, which identified the 1976 Amendments as 
being designed to “clarify and further define the additional duties which 
may be assigned” to a magistrate judge, draws a distinction between a 
broad category of pretrial motions that a magistrate judge can “hear and 
determine,” and “certain dispositive motions” for which a magistrate 
judge can only provide a report and recommendation to the district 
judge.96 The point is made even more clearly later on in the House 
Report: 
[C]ertain motions which are dispositive of the 
litigation are specifically excepted from the 
magistrate’s power . . . to “hear and determine.” 
These excepted motions are: 
(1) A motion for injunctive relief; 
(2) A motion for judgment on the pleadings; 
(3) A motion for summary judgment; 
(4) A motion to dismiss or quash an indictment made 
by defendant; 
(5) A motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case; 
(6) A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted; and 
                                                                                                             
 93 Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (“If Congress had wanted to place remand of 
removed cases beyond the ‘hear and determine’ authority of magistrate judges, it could, 
should, and would have listed it as one of the matters expressly excluded from that 
authority. Despite several amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act over the years, 
Congress has not seen fit to insert such a limitation in magistrate judge authority.”); see 
also Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411.  
 94 Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411 at * 3 (emphasis in original). 
 95 See H.R.  REP. NO. 94-1609, 617–71. 
 96 Id. 
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(7) A motion to involuntarily dismiss an action for 
failure to comply with an order of the court.97 
Thus, Congress not only indicated that only certain dispositive 
motions should be subject to de novo review, not all dispositive motions, 
but also identified those “certain” motions. The House and Senate 
Reports make clear that Congress intended that the motions identified in 
Section 636(a)(1)(B)—regardless of whether they are characterized as 
“dispositive” or “excepted”—were intended to be an exhaustive list of 
the motions that fell beyond the scope of a magistrate judge’s authority. 
Because remand is not on the list, it should not be seen as being beyond 
the power of a magistrate judge to “hear and determine.” 
Reading the Act to permit magistrate judges to “hear and 
determine” remand motions is not only consistent with the plain 
language of the Act, but also accords with the canon of expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius. Under this principle of statutory construction, the 
express inclusion of certain items on a list implies the exclusion of other 
items not included on the list.98 Congress’s express inclusion of eight 
specific motions that are beyond a magistrate judge’s authority implies 
that magistrate judges are permitted to “hear and determine” any motions 
not included on the list. While the Supreme Court has noted that this 
canon “does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping,”99 it does 
apply in situations, such as this one, where there is evidence that “the 
items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not 
inadvertence.”100 Here, this evidence exists in the text of the Act, the 
                                                                                                             
 97 Id.  Note that the House Report included in the list of “excepted motions” a motion 
for involuntarily dismissal “for failure to comply with an order of the court,” whereas the 
final version of the Act was less specific in its reference to motions “to involuntarily 
dismiss an action.”  This appears to cut against the position adopted by the Third Circuit 
in In re U.S. Healthcare, and subsequently followed by the Second, Sixth, and Tenth 
Circuits, that a remand motion is akin to a motion to involuntarily dismiss an action for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as it appears that Congress intended the “involuntary 
dismissal” exception to be more narrow than these courts believe it to be. 
 98 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620–21 (8th ed. 2004). 
 99 Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003). 
 100 Id. (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)). Although beyond the 
scope of this article, Justice Scalia criticized the majority decision in Barnhart for 
suggesting that the expressio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine does not apply unless it 
appears that Congress considered the specific items excluded from a list: 
It is also an absurd limitation, since it means that the more 
unimaginable an unlisted item is, the more likely it is not to be 
excluded. Does this new maxim mean, for example, that 
exceptions to the hearsay rule beyond those set forth in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence must be recognized if it is unlikely 
that Congress (or perhaps the Rules committee) “considered” 
those unnamed exceptions? Our cases do not support such a 
proposition. There is no more reason to make a “case 
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exclusive nature of which is reinforced by the clear statements of 
Congressional intent set forth in the Congressional Reports 
accompanying the Act.101 
As noted above, the Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits 
looked beyond the plain language of the Act and Rule 72 to determine 
that remand was the “functional equivalent” of the dispositive motions 
listed in section 636(b)(1)(A) and thus entitled to de novo review by the 
district courts.102 This approach arose out of a belief that reading the list 
as exhaustive might create Article III issues by permitting magistrate 
judges to “exercise final decision making authority” over dispositive 
motions not included on the list.103 These concerns are misplaced, 
however, because district courts always maintain “final decision making 
authority” over matters heard by magistrate judges, regardless of whether 
such motions are characterized as dispositive or nondispositive. The only 
difference is the standard that is applied by district courts to their review 
of “certain dispositive matters” that are identified in section 
636(b)(1)(A). 
Congress never intended to vest magistrate judges with the 
authority to issue final orders that would be immune from review by the 
district courts. In fact, Congress intended that district courts would 
maintain final control over matters handled by magistrate judges, 
beginning with the requirement that district courts choose which 
matters—dispositive and nondispositive—to designate to magistrate 
judges and continuing to final review of magistrate judges’ decisions.104 
                                                                                                             
unprovided for” exception to the clear import of an exclusive 
listing than there is to make such an exception to any other 
clear textual disposition. In a way, therefore, the Court’s 
treatment of this issue has ample precedent-in those many 
wrongly decided cases that replace what the legislature said 
with what courts think the legislature would have said (i.e., in 
the judges’ estimation should have said) if it had only 
“considered” unanticipated consequences of what it did say (of 
which the courts disapprove). 
Id. at 180–81 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 101 Contra Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) (doctrine of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where “expansive phrasing” used by 
Congress—identifying consequences that “may include” a list of certain options—“points 
directly away from . . . exclusive specification”) (emphasis added). 
 102 In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 145–46; First Union, 229 F.3d at 995–96; 
Vogel, 258 F.3d at 515–26; Williams, 527 F.3d at 264–65. 
 103 First Union, 229 F.3d at 996 (quoting Ocelot Oil Corp v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 
1458, 1463 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also, In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 145 (“In 
considering this issue, we point out that we must take into account the ‘potential for Art. 
III constraints in permitting a magistrate to make decisions on dispositive motions.’”). 
 104 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (“[A] full-time United States . . . [magistrate judge] or a 
part-time United States . . . [magistrate judge] who serves as a full-time judicial officer 
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The Act and FED. R. CIV. P.72, collectively permit the district court to 
“reconsider” any “pretrial matter”105 and “modify or set aside any portion 
of [a] magistrate judge’s order [that is] found to be clearly erroneous or 
contrary to law.”106This intention was further clarified by Congress in the 
Reports that accompanied the 1976 amendments to the Federal 
Magistrates Act: 
The [Act] provides for different procedures depending 
upon whether the proceeding involves a matter 
preliminary to trial or a motion which is dispositive of 
the action. In either case, the order or the 
recommendation of the magistrate judge is subject to 
final review by a judge of the court.107 
Thus, Congress acknowledged the Article III concerns relied upon 
by the circuit courts in support of the position that the list of motions 
identified in section 636(b)(1)(A) is illustrative instead of exhaustive, 
and addressed those concerns by requiring that “final decision making 
authority” remain with the district courts.108 As a result, these 
constitutional concerns do not support reading additional dispositive 
motions into the list of “certain dispositive motions” for which de novo 
review by the district court is required under the Act or Rule 72. 
                                                                                                             
may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry 
of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the 
district court or courts he serves.”); Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 685–86 (Blackmun, J. 
concurring) (noting that the district court is always “waiting in the wings, fully able to 
correct errors” and thus failing to “perceive the threat to the judicial power or the 
independence of the judicial decision making that underlies Art. III.”). 
 105 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 
 106 FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). 
 107 H.R. REP.  NO. 94-609, 6162 (emphasis added) 
 108 E.g., Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (“As long as the remand order secures [the 
right of review or reconsideration by a district court judge], there is certainly no 
constitutional infirmity, much less any policy reason, precluding the vesting of remand 
authority in magistrate judges.”). In Johnson, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Alabama noted that, in both In re U.S. Healthcare and Vogel, there was no 
opportunity for the parties to seek review by the district courts of the magistrate judges 
remand orders because the terms of the magistrates’ orders foreclosed any such review. 
Id. at 1273 n. 1. As the Johnson court noted: “[I]mmediate remand clearly does raise 
constitutional concerns about maintaining the Article III judge’s duty to oversee the work 
of the magistrate judge.”  Id. However, no such concerns are presented where there is the 
opportunity for review of a magistrate judge’s order by a district court judge. By contrast, 
bankruptcy court judges, who are also non-Article III judges, are permitted to enter final 
orders that are not subject to automatic review by district courts in the manner that 
magistrate judges’ orders (or recommendations) are reviewed, and this practice has 
survived constitutional scrutiny. E.g., FED R. BANKR. P. 8001, 8002. 
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B. Remand Motions Are Not Dispositive Because They Do Not Resolve 
Any Claims Or Defenses. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “dispositive” as “bringing about a 
final determination.”109 Based on this definition, numerous district courts 
have concluded that remand is not dispositive because it does not bring 
about a final determination of any claims or defenses in a case, but 
instead simply determines whether those claims and defenses will be 
adjudicated in state or federal court.110 As the District Court for the 
Western District of New York has noted: 
[A] remand order, unlike an order of dismissal, is not 
dispositive. A dismissal ends a lawsuit . . . An order 
of remand is not the functional equivalent. It neither 
disposes of the merits of a party’s claim nor 
terminates the party’s ability to seek such a 
disposition; most importantly, it in no way ends the 
litigation, not even conditionally. To the contrary, a 
remand order guarantees that a pending lawsuit will 
continue, albeit in a different forum. Indeed, a remand 
to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is in an 
important sense precisely the opposite of an order of 
dismissal: whereas the latter ends the parties’ lawsuit 
altogether, the former restores it to its original status 
as an active case in state court.111 
Stated differently, remand does not resolve any substantive issues 
between the parties and does not end the litigation, thus it cannot be said 
to “bring about a final determination” of the dispute in a manner similar 
to the other motions listed in section 636(b)(1)(A). Even commentators 
who do not interpret the list of motions enumerated in section 
636(b)(1)(A) to be exhaustive nonetheless agree that remand is not 
dispositive because it does not resolve the claims or defenses of the 
parties: “the desire of a party to proceed in federal court cannot 
reasonably be considered a claim, and therefore rulings on motions to 
remand removed cases should not be considered dispositive.”112 
The legislative history of the Act further supports this reading of 
the term “dispositive,” and is more consistent with Congressional intent 
                                                                                                             
 109 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 505 (8th ed. 2004). 
 110 See supra note 66; see also Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 
26 (D.D.C. 2001) (defining a dispositive motion as “a motion that, if granted, would 
result either in the determination of a particular claim on the merits or elimination of such 
a claim from the case.”). 
 111 Meier, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 243. 
 112 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3068.2 (p. 340) (2d ed. 1997). 
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than the contrary reading adopted by the Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth 
Circuits. As set forth in the House Report that accompanied the 1976 
amendments to the Act, Congress only intended to remove from the 
scope of a magistrate judge’s authority “certain motions” that were 
“dispositive of the litigation” or “dispositive of the matter.”113 As noted 
above, remand is not dispositive of the litigation or the matter because it 
does not resolve any substantive issues related to any claims or defenses 
at issue, but instead simply forces the parties to litigate these issues in 
state court rather than federal court.     
In addition to being more true to the meaning of the term 
dispositive and the letter and spirit of the Act, characterizing remand as 
nondispositive is also consistent with the practical implications of 
remand. On remand, a lawsuit returns to the state court in the same 
posture that it existed the moment before the remand order was entered. 
Any pleadings that were filed between removal and remand are adopted 
by the state court,114 and any unresolved motions filed while the case was 
in federal court are transferred to the state court for resolution.115 It is as 
if the case file simply gets handed back to the state court, updated with 
whatever pleadings and motions were filed in federal court. In this 
regard, remand is substantively indistinguishable from a motion to 
transfer venue, which is undoubtedly within the scope of a magistrate’s 
authority to “hear and determine.” As such, it is not dispositive as that 
term is commonly understood. 
This reading of the plain language of the Act and Rule 72 is further 
buttressed by the fact that several jurisdictions have adopted local rules 
to define “dispositive motions,” and none of them have characterized 
remand as dispositive.116 For instance, the local rules for the District of 
Nebraska define “dispositive matters” as those excepted by 28 U.S.C. 
636(b)(1)(A).117 Rules like this one and similar ones enacted in other 
jurisdictions effectively codify the decisions of the overwhelming 
majority of district courts that the term “dispositive,” should be limited 
                                                                                                             
113 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1609, at 6162, 6170–71.   
 114 E.g., Edward Hansen, Inc. v. Kearny Post Office Associates, 166 N.J. Super. 161, 
170 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (“[T]he adoption of the pleadings would result in the 
post-remand procedure in this court mirroring as nearly as possible the post-removal 
procedure in the federal court . . . . Adoption of the federal pleadings would result in this 
court’s renewing its jurisdiction with the case in exactly the same posture as when it was 
remanded from the federal court.”). 
 115 E.g., Delgado v. Shell Oil, 890 F. Supp 1324, 1350 n.54 (S.D. Tex 1995) 
(“Because these cases will be remanded, any unaddressed pending motion in these cases 
must be addressed to the state courts.”). 
 116 E.g., D. NEB. L. CIV. R. 72.2(a); W.D. MICH. L. CIV. R.R. 7.2, 7.3; E.D. TEX L. CIV. 
R. app B; see also  CT. INT’L TRADE R. 7(g). 
 117 D. NEB. L. CIV. R. 72.2(a).  
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consistent with the list of “certain dispositive motions” identified in the 
Act. 
The circuit courts have rejected this analysis and have instead 
suggested that remand is the “functional equivalent” of a motion for 
involuntary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because both 
motions “banish” the case from the federal courts.118 This reasoning was 
the lynchpin of the In re U.S. Healthcare decision and has been relied 
upon by the Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits in adopting the Third 
Circuit’s reasoning and conclusion. However, this analogy is ultimately 
unpersuasive because dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is 
not an “adjudication on the merits” under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and thus, like remand, is not dispositive of an action.119 As the 
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina has observed: 
In the absence of three specific situations—one of 
which is lack of subject matter jurisdiction—an 
involuntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b) is claim dispositive . . . . Therefore, it 
is no surprise that involuntary dismissals were 
included in the § 636(b)(1)(A) list, alongside motions 
for summary judgment, motions under Rule 12(b)(6), 
and motions for judgment on the pleadings. The fact 
that Congress did not exclude the three exceptions to 
the usual “adjudication upon the merits” of Rule 41(b) 
when creating the § 636(b)(1)(A) list is no basis to 
conclude that remand orders should likewise be 
beyond the “hear and determine” power of a 
magistrate judge.120 
The analogy to motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction actually supports the conclusion that remand is not the 
“functional equivalent” of the dispositive motions included in section 
636(b)(1)(A). Like motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, remand does not bar the future litigation of the issues 
involved in the lawsuit on res judicata or collateral estoppel grounds.121 
                                                                                                             
 118 Williams, 527 F.3d at 266; First Union, 229 F.3d at 995–96; Vogel, 258 F.3d at 
515–16; In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 145–46. 
 119 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
 120 Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. at 702; see also Young, 168 F.R.D. at 27 (“Involuntary 
dismissals [] are governed by Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides that “a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in 
this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction . . . operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits. Therefore, under this section, dismissals for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction are not considered to be final decisions of a party’s claims.”). 
 121 18A CHARLES A WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4436, n.1 (2d ed. 2002) (“There is little mystery about the 
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Thus, to the extent that remand is even comparable to a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the comparison actually 
supports the notion that remand is not dispositive because, unlike the 
dispositive motion identified in Section 636(b)(1)(A), remand is not a 
final adjudication on the merits of a claim or defense. 
C. Permitting Magistrate Judges To “Hear And Determine” Remand 
Motion Is Consistent With Congressional Intent. 
As noted above, Congress has steadily expanded the scope of 
magistrate judges’ authority in an effort to “increase the overall 
efficiency of the federal judiciary,”122 and has done so primarily by 
“vesting magistrate judges with sufficient authority to . . . assist 
effectively in managing the heavy caseload borne by the district 
courts.”123 To this end, Congress intended to leave district judges free to 
“experiment with the assignment to magistrates of other functions in the 
aid of the business of the courts,” in order to increase the “time available 
to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of their vital and 
traditional adjudicatory duties.124 The Act and Rule 72 must be read 
consistent with these intentions. Permitting magistrate judges to “hear 
and determine” remand motions furthers this intent. In contrast, the 
approach adopted by the Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits is the 
type of narrow, non-pragmatic interpretation that Congress has 
repeatedly rejected. 
On the flip side, there is a danger not only in narrowing the types of 
motions magistrate judges are permitted to “hear and determine,” but 
also in adding to the list of matters that district courts must review de 
novo. As a court in the District Court for the Northern District of 
Alabama recently noted: 
If too many motions are added to the list of those 
which a magistrate judge may not determine, the 
purpose of the magistrate judge system is defeated 
and they become little more than super briefing 
                                                                                                             
res judicata effects of a judgment that dismisses an action for lack of subject-matter or 
personal jurisdiction or for improper venue. Civil Rule 41(b) provides that a dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction or improper venue does not operate as an adjudication upon the 
merits.”); contra Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1461–62 (10th Cir. 
1988) (striking of pleadings with prejudice as sanction for discovery violation was 
comparable to motion for involuntary dismissal under Section 636(B)(1)(A) because it 
“has the effect of dismissing [plaintiff’s] action, contrary to [plaintiff’s] wishes, and 
operates as res judicata.”). 
 122 Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 702. 
 123 Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1274. 
 124 H. R. REP. NO. 94-1609 at 6172. 
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clerks, writing recommendations that the district court 
must review de novo. The district courts are thus 
relieved of little, if any, of their case load and an 
entire level of the federal judiciary is relieved of its 
ability to assist in managing that case load . . . . [I]f 
magistrate judges were not empowered to decide 
motions which resolve issues, they “would not have 
authority to ‘hear and determine’ much of what 
dominates their dockets on a daily basis.”125 
The district court for the District of Nebraska echoed this 
sentiment, albeit in the context of a magistrate judge’s ability to order 
Rule 11 sanctions, cautioning that only those “rulings which finally 
resolve a party’s ‘claim or defense,’” should be considered dispositive or 
else the usefulness of the magistrate judge to the district court will be 
significantly curtailed: 
Indeed, if this were the case magistrate judges would 
not have authority to “hear and determine” much of 
what dominates their dockets on a daily basis. 
Magistrate judges in this court, and undoubtedly 
many other district courts, routinely enter orders 
which have the effect of disposing of many litigation 
issues. For instance, magistrate judges enter: (1) 
orders denying requests to proceed in forma pauperis; 
(2) progression orders setting discovery deadlines and 
trial dates; (3) orders granting and denying discovery 
motions; (4) orders denying motions to join additional 
parties; (5) orders denying motions to amend for 
purposes of adding a claim or defense; (6) orders 
striking pleadings for failure to comply with FED. R. 
CIV. P. 8; (7) orders striking exhibits or witnesses for 
failure to comply with the court’s progression order 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 16; (8) preclusion orders 
prohibiting the use of certain exhibits or testimony at 
trial as a discovery sanction under Rule 37; (9) 
protective orders under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); (10) 
orders transferring cases to other districts or to the 
Panel on Multi District Litigation; (11) orders 
voluntarily dismissing claims or entire actions; and 
(12) garnishment orders pursuant FED. R. CIV. P. 69. 
Of course, this list is not intended to be exhaustive 
and certainly there are a host of additional orders 
                                                                                                             
 125 Vaquillas Ranch, 844 F. Supp. at 1162–63 (citations omitted); see also Matthews, 
423 U.S. at 268 (refusing to relegate magistrate judges to the role of “super-notaries”). 
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routinely and properly entered by magistrate judges 
which dispose of litigation issues.126 
Accordingly, if magistrate judges are to continue to be a useful and 
effective “lower tier of judicial officers” as Congress intended, they must 
be permitted to “hear and determine” remand motions. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
If district court judges can be seen as voting through their decisions 
on this issue, then the results appear clear that they believe that 
permitting magistrate judges to “hear and decide” remand motions would 
“aid in the business of the courts” and “improve the overall efficiency” 
of the federal judicial system. Given that magistrate judges were created 
by Congress to assist district judges, this unanimity provides strong 
support for the notion that the “experiment” of using magistrate judges to 
“hear and determine” remand motions should be endorsed by the courts 
and, if necessary, Congress when it next addresses the Act. Ultimately, in 
light of the split between the district courts and the circuit courts 
regarding the ability of magistrate judges to “hear and determine” 
remand motions, there is once again a need to heed the advice of Justices 
Burger and White in the Wingo decision and “act to restate its intentions 
if its declared objectives are to be carried out in the discretion of a judge 
of the district court.” Until this happens, magistrate judges should be 
permitted to “hear and determine” remand motions, and the next circuit 
court faced with the task of defining the scope of a magistrate judge’s 
authority to “hear and determine” such motions should adhere more 
closely to the letter and spirit of the Act when deciding the issue. 
 
                                                                                                             
 126 148 F.R.D. at 640 n.9. 
